
I was recently watching a video of a Honda robot screwing a tiny screw, and it struck me how fast progress is happening in the field of robotics. In 2014, I excitedly watched Boston Dynamics showcase their clunky humanoid robot Atlas and eagerly awaited its next iterations, but progress seemed painfully slow. I thought it unlikely that any sort of independently competent robot would emerge within the next 20 years.
How wrong I was. Over the last couple of years, there has been an explosion in robotics, driven by the rapid advancement of AI, and it now looks very likely that we will have meaningful humanoid labour replacements within the next decade.
Which brings us to some very important questions: what does this mean for human job security? Generative AI is already disrupting white-collar work and if progress continues at its current rate, where will we be globally in another 5, 10, or 25 years?
Beyond AI and robotics, there are other forces we must factor in: human fertility levels, the immigration policies of the developed world, and climate change. These are deeply interconnected issues that form the defining challenges of this century.
The Developed World vs the Developing
Purchasing power and quality of life remain deeply polarised on the global stage. Western Europe, North America, Australia, Japan, and South Korea sit at the high end, while Sub-Saharan Africa, much of South Asia, and parts of Latin America remain dramatically lower — not just in wages, but in healthcare access, housing quality, and economic security.
Ironically, it is precisely these developed nations that record the lowest fertility rates, producing ageing populations and shrinking workforces. To sustain economic growth, they have historically relied on two levers: offshoring production and increasing immigration. For decades, this broadly worked and the search for greener pastures drove migration from poorer to wealthier nations, and both sides generally benefited.
Then AI threw a spanner into the whole mechanism.
Generative AI has only been in effective widespread use for a couple of years, but it has already begun disrupting white-collar jobs. Hiring is at some of its lowest levels since the pandemic in many developed countries. The ripple effects have spread across borders too where entry-level coding, software testing, and data administration roles across Asia have been hit hard by automation. Creative sectors are next, with AI-generated animation, copywriting, and design beginning to erode what was once a thriving outsourcing economy.
What makes this particularly volatile is the political dimension. Faced with hiring squeezes and economic insecurity, it is entirely predictable that populations in wealthy nations would turn against immigration. Migrants are the most visible and politically convenient target for anxieties that are, in truth, far more structural in nature. And as policymakers respond by tightening borders, the economic gap created by reduced migration will only push them further towards AI adoption. It is a self-reinforcing loop.
The next five years are likely to bring genuine political and societal upheaval in the developed world. In the developing world, however, the early impact will look deceptively stable. Manufacturing and garment sectors remain largely human-operated. Remittances from diaspora workers continue to be a critical economic lifeline for low-income countries across Asia and Africa. But migration pressure at borders stays high as the human supply is unrelenting even as political doors close.
The Robotics Reckoning
By the mid-2030s, robotics will have become a genuine economic force. Humanoid and task-specific robots will have crossed enough cost and capability thresholds to begin displacing physical labour in manufacturing, warehousing, agriculture, and eventually construction. This is devastating for the traditional development model that every successful emerging economy has ever used: start with cheap-labour manufacturing, accumulate capital, move up the value chain. The ladder that China and South Korea climbed is being pulled up behind them.
Countries like Vietnam, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Cambodia which were well-positioned to be the next wave of manufacturing hubs now face a structural trap. The jobs simply won’t arrive in the volume they did for previous generations. Their young, growing populations represent a demographic dividend that will have nowhere to invest itself productively.
Meanwhile, developed countries will be navigating a painful but more manageable transition. AI productivity gains are real and measurable in GDP terms, but the distribution of those gains is deeply unequal, flowing primarily to capital owners and highly skilled workers. This creates a political paradox: economies technically growing, while median quality of life stagnates or declines. GDP as a measure of national wellbeing will again be exposed as a deeply inadequate metric.
Navigating What Comes Next
For developed nations, the central question is whether the AI productivity dividend will be distributed broadly enough to maintain social cohesion. The optimistic scenario involves universal basic income or equivalent programmes, funded by automation taxes or sovereign AI wealth funds, a mechanisms that ensure the gains of a robot-powered economy are shared rather than hoarded.
The stakes are arguably even higher for the developing world.
Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa face the most acute version of this challenge. By the 2050s, Africa’s population will be roughly 2.5 billion, with a median age in the mid-twenties. If AI and robotics have eliminated the manufacturing development pathway, and agriculture has been partially automated, the pressure for mass migration will be historically unprecedented. No wall, no policy, no enforcement mechanism fully contains the mathematics of a vast young population, constrained economic opportunity, and the constant pull of visible wealthy living standards elsewhere.
And layered on top of all of this is climate change, which is a force that developing nations must account for even though they have contributed least to it. The regions facing the sharpest economic pressure from AI and demographic strain are, by grim coincidence, the same ones most exposed to rising temperatures, erratic rainfall, coastal flooding, and collapsing agricultural yields: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and low-lying parts of Southeast Asia.
The window for action is now. And it is shorter than most policymakers appreciate.
Developing nations cannot afford to wait for the global economy to offer them the same on-ramp it gave previous generations. That on-ramp is closing.
Invest aggressively in digital and technical education.
The AI economy does not eliminate the need for human talent, it reshapes what talent is valued. Countries that build a generation of workers who can work with AI systems, rather than being replaced by them, will be positioned to export skills and services even when they cannot export manufactured goods.
Build intra-regional trade and reduce dependence on Western markets.
The African Continental Free Trade Area, Southeast Asian economic integration, and equivalent frameworks in South Asia are not merely aspirational political projects, they are economic lifelines. A developing nation that trades primarily with other developing nations is far less exposed to the protectionist swings of wealthy electorates.
Add value to natural resources at home.
Raw commodity export has always been a development trap. Developing nations rich in critical minerals that are essential to AI and clean energy economy, must resist the pressure to export them unprocessed. Domestic processing and refining creates the kind of skilled industrial base that neither AI nor robotics will eliminate quickly, while capturing far more of the value chain.
Shape AI adoption on local terms, not imported ones.
The countries that navigate the next quarter-century best will be those that treat AI as a tool to be directed, not a force to be passively absorbed. That means governments actively steering how AI is deployed domestically — in agriculture, in healthcare, in financial inclusion — rather than simply adopting foreign platforms built for foreign contexts and foreign problems.
The honest reality is that the next 25 years will be shaped less by the technology itself and more by the political and institutional choices made in response to it. AI and robotics are not inherently good or bad for humanity at the time being, they are extraordinarily powerful forces that will amplify whatever systems and values we point them at.
Developed nations that distribute their productivity gains broadly, and developing nations that move urgently to build human capital and regional resilience, have a genuine path through this.





